ABSTRACT European co-operation in foreign policy, or political co-operation, recently completed its third decade of institutional development. Most of this change has taken place at European level, often by adopting or adapting the procedures of the European Community. Yet the expansion of foreign, and now security, policy co-operation in the European Union (EU) has also increasingly penetrated into the domestic politics of its member states. This article suggests a conceptual framework for measuring the ways political co-operation has encouraged corresponding changes in EU member states. Four indicators of national adaptation are stressed: élite socialization, bureaucratic restructuring, constitutional changes, and changes in public perceptions about the desirability and legitimacy of this co-operation. These types of change demonstrate that the demands of foreign policy co-operation are much greater than those outlined in treaty articles, and must be taken into consideration as the EU negotiates its next enlargement with Central and Eastern European states and attempts to develop a European security and defense identity.
Students of European integration have long been aware of the complex relationship between the European Union (EU) and the domestic politics of its member states. At first, attention was focused on the way domestic politics and national preferences influenced policy-making at the EU level (Bulmer 1983; Moravcsik 1993 ). More recently, analysts have theorized about the ways EU membership itself changes, or perhaps 'Europeanizes,' the domestic politics of its member states. Indeed, the fact that the EU imposes such extensive, explicit demands on its members (in the form of treaty articles, secondary legislation, court cases, and so on) is one of the unique features of the European integration project. At the very least, these demands often require some degree of constitutional or bureaucratic change at the domestic level (Ladrech 1994; Mény et al. 1996; Rometsch and Wessels 1996) . At the most, these processes may even change the interests of EU member states in ways that are not immediately evident by a reading of the dry treaty articles negotiated by EU governments, as theorists more sympathetic to the constructivist Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy co-operation Michael E. Smith school of international relations have argued (Sandholtz 1996; Wendt 1994) .
A review of this growing literature seems to imply, if only by omission, that these processes, which are essential to the integration project, are largely confined to the EU's socio-economic policy areas. This is not surprising, considering that European integration has made most of its advances in these domains, some of which (such as monetary union) explicitly require a convergence of practices at the domestic level if EU-level goals are to be reached. However, the EU has been increasingly concerned about its role in world politics and has taken deliberate steps to enhance its procedures toward that end. In fact, European co-operation in foreign and security policy has now completed its third decade. With the creation of European political co-operation (EPC) in 1970, its transition to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in 1991, and the moves toward defense integration at the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils in 1999, the EU has moved increasingly closer toward fulfilling its goal of greater coherence as an international actor. The next enlargement of the EU, the most ambitious in its history, will also impose greater requirements in terms of foreign and security policy on the new members. Thus the time is ripe for an examination of the extent to which these aspirations will require corresponding changes in the foreign policy machinery of EU member states. Although several excellent studies explore the general relationship between domestic politics and EU foreign policy (Hill 1983 (Hill , 1996 de la Serre 1988) , my purpose here is to offer a conceptual framework with which to organize the findings of these and related studies in the hopes of stimulating further research. More specifically, I hope to address two questions: what particular aspects of EPC/CFSP cause sympathetic changes in national foreign policy structures, and what are the specific indicators of these changes?
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the first half, I explain how the institutional development of the CFSP issue-area, as opposed to socio-economic EU policy areas, conditions EU member states to reorient their foreign policy-making practices in certain ways. 1 The fact that this took place at all is surprising considering: 1) the usual great sensitivity among most governments about foreign policy as a 'special domain' in which national concerns dominate international (or European) interests; and 2) the fact that political co-operation rarely if ever explicitly required such changes on the part of EU states. In the second half of the article, I discuss the specific ways by which, I argue, prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients their foreign policy cultures along similar lines. In brief, these mechanisms are: élite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change, and the increase in public support for EPC. I support these assertions with evidence gathered from the growing literature on EU foreign policy and from élite interviews.
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FOREIGN POLICY AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PROBLEM-SOLVING
European foreign and security policy co-operation, or political co-operation, developed in parallel to European economic integration and is functionally linked to other aspects of political integration or union, such as those involving justice and home affairs. Yet it has still retained several distinctive features owing to fears among EU states about the 'communitarization' of this domain. These features include a reluctance to use qualified majority voting (QMV), a refusal to give the Commission an exclusive right of policy initiative, and a desire to limit the influence of the European Parliament and, especially, the European Court of Justice. Accordingly, political co-operation developed its own unique dynamic of institutional growth involving: 1) intergovernmental bargaining over the establishment and general development of the political co-operation issue-area; 2) the creation of a transgovernmental communications network among foreign ministers, political directors, and other foreign policy specialists; 3) the emergence and codification of norms, or shared standards of behavior; 4) the increasing involvement of European Community (EC) organizational actors, chiefly the Commission; and 5) the establishment of a fairly coherent policy process (when the CFSP replaced EPC) that has been increasingly linked to the policies and procedures of the 'first pillar,' the EC (Nuttall 1992; Smith 1998) .
I argue that this developmental trajectory, while seemingly dominated by negotiations among governments, has gradually and pervasively penetrated into the domestic politics of EU member states. This has taken place even though it has never been made an explicit requirement of political co-operation, and has never been encouraged by EC organizations like the Commission. Moreover, this penetration has helped to sustain the system even in the face of severe problems like institutional sclerosis in the EC during the 1970s and policy failures such as the Balkans. In this section, I focus on several norms of political co-operation that encourage a more accommodating approach to foreign policy among EU member states. In general, these norms reorient states toward a 'problem-solving,' as opposed to bargaining, style of decision-making. Bargaining occurs regularly in EU affairs; it involves the satisfaction of self-interests through trade-offs over issues, or through side-payments to opposing parties. Yet this type of co-operation tends to be discouraged in CFSP; it is oriented toward problem-solving, which involves an appeal to common interests and the use of ostracism or peer-pressure to sanction potential defectors. Problem-solving is not the only behavioral dynamic in political cooperation, of course; it has also involved damage-limitation, the promotion of common values, and more mundane processes like cheap talk. Yet problem-solving increasingly seems to be the dominant tendency in this domain. And although problem-solving has some inherent weaknesses as an institutional form (Scharpf 1988) , it is probably the only way political co-operation could have proceeded while remaining outside the framework of the Community for so long. This problem-solving has also been supported by a unique set of norms, which provided a framework for corresponding changes in EU domestic politics and improved the environment for co-operation.
The first and most fundamental norm involves regular communication and consultation on foreign policy issues. From the earliest days of political cooperation, EU member states adopted a general rule to consult with each other before adopting final positions of their own so that policies of their partners would not catch them by surprise. This norm was linked to the development of the transgovernmental communications network mentioned above: little progress toward co-operation could be made if states merely used the system to express rigid foreign policy positions to each other. According to interviews, EU states have in fact shared an increasing amount of sensitive foreign policy related information. By the mid-1970s, EPC participants were sending an average of 4,800 telegrams a year to each other regarding political issues; this number grew to nearly 13,000 a year immediately after the Treaty on European Union entered into effect (Wessels 1982; Institut für Europäische Politik 1995) . Through these communications, such a priori consultations help to define political co-operation as an issue-area and foster the development of a communauté de vue on what constitutes 'European interests. ' Second, CFSP discussions are confidential; states cannot use information shared during them to embarrass or blame other states. Institutionalized communications and the engineering of trust are the foundations of the system; the norm of secrecy undoubtedly encourages confidence among EU states since they typically do not have to fear public politicization of issues brought up for discussion, embarrassment at failure, or that information shared will be used against them. Discussions in the context of political co-operation have been occasionally leaked, of course, yet states have adhered to this rule to a surprising extent when compared to other forums for multilateral co-operation. While this rule apparently violates some more fundamental rules of European integration (such as democratic legitimacy and openness), it is difficult to see how political co-operation could have proceeded without it.
Third, despite limited provisions for QMV in the Maastricht Treaty, CFSP discussions are also usually conducted by consensus; any state can block a discussion of a sensitive matter with little or no justification. In theory, all CFSP delegations are equal, and unanimity is required for most decisions. Although EU states are fully aware of their different capabilities, in the CFSP they at least attempt to act as if each state has an equal stake in the system. This norm has been increasingly challenged over the years with enlargement and the growing number of difficult issues on the CFSP agenda, but in general it makes discussions less threatening since states feel they can terminate them at will. Smaller states also appreciate the fact that the larger EU states cannot impose their preferences on others. Unanimity is not necessarily a paralyzing rule, as one might assume of a consensual system. Officials do not always resort to the lowest common denominator position, as intergovernmental theories suggest (Moravcsik 1991) , but tend toward compromise and medianism in the hopes of reaching agreement. As Simon Nuttall (1992: 12) recalls of EPC, the system did not operate under the 'perpetual threat of veto' and officials made 'genuine efforts to reach a positive outcome.' Fourth, the secrecy norm is closely related to the most important unspoken rule in the CFSP: the notion of domaines résérves, or subjects considered off-limits owing to the objections of one or more EU states. These subjects usually include unilateral problems, whether domestic (such as separatism) or foreign (Greece's attitude toward Turkey); bilateral problems between EU member states (such as Northern Ireland); and certain military crises affecting one or more partners (such as Africa). For a long time, such issues were outside the scope of political co-operation, except at the direct initiative of the state(s) involved. At first, this norm occasionally prevented the discussion of many issues, particularly those concerning security or defense. However, as the CFSP developed and its ambitions grew, this norm became increasingly challenged, and we can observe a gradual expansion of the political co-operation agenda to include previously taboo subjects.
Taken together, these problem-solving norms have built trust among EU states and have created a climate conducive to the forging of common positions on a number of difficult issues. These positions, and, later, joint actions, are used as points of reference by EU member states in future situations. It is impossible to imagine that they could have been forced onto EU states by an activist Commission or European Court (i.e. 'political spillover') as happens in other policy domains, although the European Parliament has certainly attempted to influence the process of political co-operation (for example, by making it more sensitive to human rights). More importantly, these political co-operation working methods have had feedback effects into European domestic politics which help to reinforce the system in the absence of sustained central leadership by EC organizations.
INDICATORS OF ADAPTATION
In this section I conceptualize the primary (but certainly not the only) ways by which domestic adaptation to political co-operation is expressed. In decreasing order of importance, they are: 1) élite socialization; 2) bureaucratic reorganization; 3) constitutional change; and 4) the increase in public support for European political co-operation.
Élite socialization
Problem-solving fundamentally depends on the extent to which relevant decisionmakers are socialized into the system, since it implies a certain level of trust among actors, and a certain amount of devotion to a common enterprise. Institutionalized networks and the passage of time encourage this socialization. Another facet of this socialization concerns the fact that EU member states, or even governments, are not unitary actors, even in the domain of foreign and security policy. This domain is subject to the same dynamics of 'multi-level governance' and overlapping policy networks (Marks et al. 1996; Peterson 1995) as other EU policy areas. Thus, a vital distinction must be made between temporary governments (and their personal representatives) who take decisions at the highest levels and the entrenched lowerlevel officials who prepare the decisions and communicate with their EU partners on a regular basis in numerous institutionalized settings. Disaggregating the state in this way allows us to capture the intergovernmental and transgovernmental aspects of political co-operation, as it involves both high-level bargaining (typically over very general procedural and substantive goals) and the gradual internalization of cooperative habits and common views within the structures of member states, which persist beyond individual governments.
Memoirs and interviews with EPC/CFSP insiders consistently reveal the import-ance of socialization. For example, there is little doubt that, although political cooperation in the EU has come a long way since the first experiments with EPC, it has always remained an élite phenomenon. According to Hill and Wallace (1996: 7) , the success of EPC and its appeal to foreign ministers are partly because of its 'selfcontained characteristic: the secrecy of discussions, in sharp contrast to the leakiness of Community negotiations, the absence of domestic lobbies and entrenched interest groups.' Political co-operation participants often recall its 'club-like' atmosphere; it provided many opportunities for stimulating discussions, and then common actions, on world politics, often in very agreeable surroundings. As Simon Nuttall describes the atmosphere:
The success of EPC came through socialization. All participants in EPC attest to the beneficial effect of the club atmosphere in bringing points of view closer together and making concessions easier . . . For socialization to work, however, you had to socialize. Meetings were important, but so were lunches and dinners and agreeable little excursions, and the atmosphere depended on light procedures and not too many participants. (Nuttall 1997: 3) Most of this socialization takes place in an increasingly dense, institutionalized, transgovernmental communications network. Thanks to the intense socialization within this complex network, From the perspective of a diplomat in the foreign ministry of a member state, styles of operating and communication have been transformed. The COREU telex network, EPC working groups, joint declarations, joint reporting, even the beginnings of staff exchanges among foreign ministries and shared embassies: all these have moved the conduct of national foreign policy away from the old nation-state national sovereignty model towards a collective endeavour, a form of high-level networking with transformationalist effects and even more potential. (Hill and Wallace 1996: 6) It is even possible that such intensive deliberation within the EPC/CFSP working groups encourages the formation of nascent 'epistemic communities' of technical experts devoted to solving particular problems, as Müller and van Dassen (1997: 68) have suggested in their analysis of the EU's efforts regarding nonproliferation. In these more technical areas, the common understandings, meanings, and solutions created by the participants help to reinforce and perpetuate the substance and procedures of political co-operation. Charles de Gaulle had another name for this process, 'copinage technocratique,' whereby friendly, 'old-boy' networks among transnational/EU experts concerning specific policy problems threatened the sovereignty of EU member states.
Although it is going too far to suggest that these officials abandoned national loyalties in favor of European interests or that they never felt any conflicts between national and European goals, it is possible to recognize attitude changes in terms of two indicators of cognitive socialization: élites became far more familiar with each other's positions regarding foreign policy, and they learned to value political co-operation as a way to enhance their own foreign policy capabilities. Indeed, Weiler and Wessels (1988: 243-8) have suggested that the most appropriate theory for political co-operation is the consociational model, where a 'cartel' of élites regularly co-operates to preserve functionality and stability. In this model, élites must: 1) share a commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion, functionality, and stability; and 2) understand the dangers of political fragmentation. Since political co-operation has never suffered a major institutional crisis during its history (unlike the EC, as during the 'empty chair' episode of 1965), it certainly seems that political co-operation élites tend to share these values.
Bureaucratic adaptation
A more visible manifestation of the domestic impact of political co-operation involves changes in national foreign ministries. While these ministries have not fully harmonized their operations to accommodate political co-operation, there is substantial evidence to show that EU membership in general and CFSP membership in particular influence the way individual member states organize their pursuit of foreign policy. Political co-operation priorities become national priorities, and EU member states are expected to live up to these joint commitments. One aspect of this responsibility involves expressing common positions and acting on behalf of the EU, particularly when holding the EU Presidency. These requirements in turn tend to encourage more far-reaching changes in national foreign ministries beyond privileging their overall role in the process. To the extent that these changes last beyond individual changes of government and take place in accordance with CFSP requirements, political co-operation is enhanced. Three changes in particular will be stressed, although others can be mentioned.
First, political co-operation requires the establishment of new national officials to serve it. These institutional roles persist beyond the appointment of specific individuals and provide a key source of continuity in national attention to CFSP affairs. Second, political co-operation encourages the expansion of most national diplomatic services (although there have been some cutbacks since the end of the Cold War). Third, political co-operation leads to a clear reorientation (and, in a few states, also a reorganization of internal administrative structures) of national foreign ministries toward 'Europe' in order to improve their handling of European affairs, particularly as EC and CFSP activities are increasingly expected to function in a coherent manner. While some EU states have maintained a distinction between their economic (EC) and political (CFSP) departments, in others there has been a much closer linkage between the two in the hopes of maintaining consistency of external policy. Together, these three developments have helped to reinforce the norms of political co-operation, and they have also spilled over, to some extent, into national military structures.
The first change, establishing new officials, stems from the fact that political cooperation relies in part on regular meetings among the political directors of EU member states, a position that already existed for most states. However, the 1973 Copenhagen Report specifically required the establishment of a 'Group of Correspondents' (later 'European Correspondents') to prepare meetings of political directors and liaise with their counterparts in other EU states. This Group was permanently devoted to political co-operation and a great deal of the aforementioned socialization took place within it. The Report also required each EU state to link itself to the COREU telex network, another permanent bureaucratic innovation designed to improve political co-operation. These were the only permanent administrative changes required of political co-operation until after the Maastricht Treaty (beyond the normal sharing of diplomats and staffing of the EPC Secretariat). By that time, coordination problems between Political Directors and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) concerning the CFSP had encouraged the establishment of 'CFSP counselors' attached to each member state's permanent representation to the EU. These new officials give a much greater sense of consistency to the CFSP while improving its links to the first pillar.
The second and third areas of change, expansion and reorganization, can be considered together as they often occurred simultaneously for most EU member states. There is little doubt that political co-operation prompted a common trend toward the expansion in size and finances of foreign ministries in most member states, as well as an increase in the number of their missions to third countries owing to its growing workload. This took place even in the face of countervailing pressures to scale back diplomatic resources in the face of decolonization and severe economic pressures on public expenditures in all EU member states in the 1970s. For example, between 1972 and 1978 seven of nine EU member states increased their missions in third countries. The growth of foreign missions during this key period of institutional development is summarized in Table 1 . Most observers also report a growth in foreign accreditations to EU states after EPC was created. Even foreign accreditations to a tiny EU state like Luxembourg grew from 70 in 1967 to 124 in 1981 (Lorenz 1983: 160) . The expansion most directly related to political co-operation involves the growth of staffs and budgets in national foreign ministries. Part of this expansion is because of the growth of the political co-operation agenda, which requires EU states to develop some level of expertise in areas which previously had not concerned them. It is also owing to the development of the institution of the EU Presidency, which for many years maintained sole responsibility for setting the political co-operation agenda and representing this agenda abroad. The increasing demands on the EU Presidency directly encouraged the sharing of officials in the 'Troika' framework, the increasing involvement of the Commission in political co-operation, and the establishment of the EPC/CFSP Secretariat. These demands have also encouraged all EU states (especially the smaller ones) to increase their staff numbers and budgets at the national level when serving as President of the EU (see the individual states surveyed in O'Nuallain 1985). They have also required more central control by foreign ministries, as we saw above. The burden of the EU Presidency was especially felt by new member states, who had no previous experience with such a responsibility and had to make rapid adjustments, which often included the expansion of the foreign ministry. For example, the first Spanish Presidency (1989) was 'the biggest task ever undertaken by the government and the Spanish administration,' in terms of organization and co-ordination (Spanish foreign ministry document cited in Barbé 1996: 111) .
In addition to expansion, it is also quite clear that foreign ministries in several EU member states -particularly France, Denmark, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom -became better able to assert some central or strategic political control over external relations in their respective governments owing to the need to co-ordinate foreign policies between the EC and EPC (Hill and Wallace 1979: 58-9 ). The United Kingdom has shown the least evidence of change, as its Foreign and Commonwealth Office has long been wholly responsible for Europe's external policies, while internal European policy-making is shared with relevant ministries in the United Kingdom. However, as security policy in the EU has developed, so has some measure of co-ordination with the Ministry of Defense (Armstrong and Bulmer 1996: 270) .
While France has preferred to develop political co-operation institutions in harmony with its own highly entrenched presidential-dominant system, Germany has seen more disputes over the division of labor for EPC/EC affairs, and of course it is somewhat constrained by the independent Länder (Rummel and Wessels 1983: 49-50) . Similarly, Italy did not undergo structural changes, but saw some changes in its working methods (Italy did create a Ministry for the Co-ordination of Community Policies in 1980, but this did not typically involve EPC affairs). Political co-operation in Italy is handled by the Political Affairs Directorate in its foreign ministry, as in France and Germany. Still, all three countries have been able to reorient themselves in the view of co-ordinating the political and economic dimensions of Europe's external relations.
More substantial changes can be seen in almost all other EU states. According to most observers, smaller EU states in particular saw a revolution -in terms of reorganization and expansion -in their foreign ministries to cope with the political co-operation workload. With their limited representation outside the EU, they especially benefitted from information shared by larger states. EPC/CFSP meetings and the COREU network have become their 'umbilical cord' to events outside Europe, in the words of one observer (Lorenz 1983: 161) . To improve their participation in the mechanism, they have also been more willing than larger states to make structural changes in their national bureaucracies. For example, in the Belgian foreign ministry the co-ordination of Community affairs moved from the 'European Integration Department' of the External Economic directorate to the 'European Organizations Department' of the Political Affairs directorate. The responsibilities of this directorate include European political integration (including EPC/CFSP), the EC (political and institutional problems), the Council of Europe, and Western European Union. The European Integration Department still participates in the co-ordination of EC/CFSP affairs, but the European Organizations Department has overall responsibility. This has strengthened the articulation of policy at the department level on EC/CFSP matters. As Franck (1983: 96) notes, the significance is that 'a single service, responsible both for coordination and for Belgian participation in EPC, has an overview embracing the two main areas of European activity.' Indeed, Belgian officials pride themselves on the way their foreign ministry effectively co-ordinates all EU activities. Similarly, Luxembourg had a very limited administrative capacity for foreign affairs until 1970. According to Lorenz, EPC triggered a 'second revolution' in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3 Although the Grand Duchy had a small diplomatic apparatus, it showed an increasing attention to international events and reported on those events to the Luxembourg government after EPC was established. There have been no major bureaucratic changes; the directorate for political/cultural affairs in the foreign ministry still handles political co-operation. According to Lorenz, there is a valid reason for this:
The progress of Luxembourg's foreign policy to an international level as it has taken place during the last ten years or so has been realized solely with the help of EPC. It is therefore generally seen as more important to reinforce the home-based diplomatic staff than to pour more resources into representations abroad which in the circumstances provide a much lower return. There is clearly a process of centralization taking place in the organization of the diplomatic service. (Lorenz 1983: 162-3) Also, since Luxembourg can rely on its partners for information in other countries, it has less need to expand its own missions abroad. However, by the mid-1980s Luxembourg officials had come out in favor of an outright expansion of the foreign ministry to cope with the demands of EPC and EC membership.
For Denmark, participation in EPC probably was 'the most significant event in Danish foreign policy since the end of the Second World War' (Haagerup and Thune 1983: 106) , even though the country often preferred to keep a low profile and tends to favor Nordic, rather than European, foreign policy co-operation. When Denmark entered the EC, there was a clear division between the departments of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Affairs, a division deliberately employed to stress that the EC was solely centered on economic matters. The Department of Foreign Economic Affairs handled most European questions, but EPC gave the Department of Foreign Affairs a little more prestige (though not in terms of budgets and staff). However, in anticipation of the Maastricht Treaty, which was expected to bring EC affairs and political co-operation together in some fashion, Denmark reorganized its foreign ministry from functional (political and economic) to geographic (North/European and South) departments to improve its handling of EU affairs. According to one insider, this change clearly eroded the authority of the Danish political director by allowing more channels of access to decision-making in Brussels. Ireland's accession to the EC/EPC prompted a rapid growth in its Department of Foreign Affairs; it doubled in size between 1967 and 1977. As Keatinge (1983: 147) observes, 'Much of this [growth] can be directly attributed to the need to cover EPC issues.' In addition, the Political Division in Ireland's Department of Foreign Affairs was created primarily in response to the demands of EPC. This division grew from only four officials responsible for all political questions in 1967 to twentyone officials by the early 1980s. It is organized according to regions and issue-areas; the head of the Political Division is the political director for Ireland. There has been less expansion in Ireland's overseas missions, making it closer to Luxembourg in this respect. However, as for other EU states, 'Membership of the Community has blurred the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs and has meant that the Department of Foreign Affairs is more intensely involved in domestic issues than at any stage in the department's history' (Laffan 1996: 297) .
The impact of political co-operation was especially felt by states which joined the EU after the 1970s. Greece had very limited resources for its diplomacy (for example, it had no embassies in developing states), making it especially dependent on others for assistance when it held the EU Presidency. In fact, the Troika framework was enhanced precisely to aid Greece during its first Presidency in the second half of 1983. Its civil service, state bureaucracy, and domestic legal apparatus were very underdeveloped (and relatively inward-looking) compared to the rest of the EU but gradually reoriented themselves toward European affairs (Tsakaloyannis 1983: 131) . Spain and Portugal were even more amenable to adapting to EPC working procedures and took steps toward this end following their accession to the EC in 1986. In anticipation of accession Spain created a General Secretary for Foreign Policy to make its foreign ministry compatible with EPC (Barbé 1996; Vasconcelos 1996) . And although it is too early to assess the full impact of CFSP membership on the states which joined the EU most recently (Austria, Finland, and Sweden), the experience of other EU states suggests that similar changes will occur for these states as well.
Constitutional changes
Political co-operation also prompted important constitutional debates in several EU states. Although far less prevalent than previous indicators, these are still worthy of mention since they demonstrate the extent to which certain EU states have been willing, despite often high political costs, to reorient their national legal structures according to the changing demands of European integration in general and political co-operation in particular. Again, the fact that EPC/CFSP never required such constitutional adaptation makes such change even more relevant for my argument about the penetration of political co-operation into domestic politics.
For example, Ireland was one of the first EU states to directly confront the constitutional implications of EPC participation in the context of the 1986 Single European Act (SEA). It did not make this choice voluntarily, as the Irish government had decided that the SEA (which legalized EPC) did not require a national referendum as part of the ratification process. Instead, a resolution and an act of the Irish parliament approved the SEA. However, a private citizen challenged this decision in the Irish Supreme Court in 1986, just before the SEA was to come into effect. A majority of this court (3-2) found that Titles I and II of the SEA did not conflict with the constitution but that Title III, which pertained to EPC, did conflict with the Irish constitution, thus requiring a referendum (Laffan 1996: 306-7) . Although the outcome (approval of the SEA) was never in serious danger, the incident dramatically raised the profile of EPC and forced the Irish government to clarify its position on the requirements of EPC in general and the meaning of Irish neutrality in particular.
Similarly, after a protracted domestic debate, Germany's government was able to reinterpret key provisions of its constitution in order to justify its participation in military operations in the Balkans and elsewhere. Previously the Germans had hidden behind certain provisions of their Basic Law, which seemed to prohibit German participation in military operations not directly related to defense. However, with the growing demands for such participation on the part of Germany's alliance partners during the Gulf War and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and with the increased salience of the debate over reforming EPC to take on such tasks, Germany was forced to reconsider its Basic Law. This debate saw the involvement of all major German parties and was conducted with the public's full attention. Not until the German Constitutional Court at Karlsruhe ruled that Germany could legally participate in such peacekeeping or humanitarian operations did the opponents of such participation give in (Smith 1996) . This action was not only due to German participation in European political co-operation, of course, but it does show the ability of European-level norms to penetrate into the most sensitive areas of national policy and encourage change. In any event, now that Germany has formally adjusted to the norm of non-defensive military intervention, it can no longer hide behind constitutional provisions when called upon to make national contributions in the future.
Finally, neutral states who joined the EU most recently (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) also were forced to reconsider their positions on security/defense issues in the context of accession. Austria's participation in the CFSP was 'sold' to the electorate by emphasizing a distinction between security co-operation and military/ defense co-operation. Although Austria's constitution defines neutrality as nonparticipation in alliances and non-admission of military bases on Austrian soil, the defense provisions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) were controversial for some and had to be justified at home. Such 'legal gymnastics,' in the words of one Austrian official (interviews; also see Scheich 1992), helped to make accession more palatable to neutral and pacifist elements in the electorate. The same process took place in Finland and Sweden (and Norway, which eventually rejected EU membership), although the debate was not conducted in such explicit constitutional terms in the manner of Ireland or Germany (Ingebritsen 1997; Laursen 1993) .
The impact of external commitments on domestic politics is felt beyond the realm of security affairs; for example, in the Netherlands, constitutional responsibility for foreign affairs rests with the foreign minister, so the Dutch have had strong reservations about the increased use of intergovernmental summits (such as the European Council or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summits, or even periodic meetings to change the CFSP) to make foreign policy. It did not want the European Council to engage in policy-making unless it agreed to be bound by Community law. As with other EU states, however, this reservation was gradually smoothed over as the European Council was embedded in a broader process of institutional change at the European level.
Political co-operation and public opinion
The three processes discussed above -élite socialization, bureaucratic changes, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional reinterpretations -are the strongest, most direct indicators of the way participation in political co-operation encouraged more fundamental changes in the domestic politics of EU member states. Yet there is one final area to consider: the extent to which the CFSP has emerged as an area of interest for European citizens. By this I mean public support for political cooperation as an appropriate EU-level policy domain, not support for individual CFSP policies. This growth of support is a relatively recent phenomenon, as a number of factors prevented political co-operation from gaining more attention on the part of EU citizens. As we have seen, one reason for this inattention stemmed from political co-operation's own rules, which required secrecy of its participants. In addition, national parliaments and media organizations do not devote much attention to political co-operation, preferring instead to focus on economic problems. In fact, the first decade of EPC saw virtually no parliamentary or public debate on European foreign policy, resulting in what Hill (1983: 189) once called 'a permissive inactivity' toward EPC among national parliaments. Finally, few interest groups were concerned about the development of political co-operation; even if they had been, there was no effective way for them to gain access to the process or to force institutional change.
However, public opinion has grown far more attentive to political co-operation. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider all possible influences on European public opinion, such as the length of a state's membership in the EU, perceptions of economic or political benefits derived from membership, linkages to other international institutions, and national foreign policy traditions, to name but a few (for extended discussions on these factors, see Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Andersen 1995) . Still, it is possible to observe a greater receptivity among European citizens to EU political and security co-operation.
As we have seen, the legalization of EPC during the SEA forced the issue of political co-operation onto the national stage in most EC states. The most prominent domestic debates over political co-operation first took place in Ireland and Denmark and were primarily conducted at the level of parties and parliaments, not citizens. The Danes joined the EC primarily for economic reasons and have always been skeptical of a greater role for political co-operation, particularly in security affairs. For example, public opposition to EC membership was twice as great as that to NATO, and this opposition also applied to an extension of political co-operation in the EC. Indeed, the issue was not even discussed in the media until the SEA. Yet, a strong majority in favor of the EC emerged in the Danish Folketing among all parties, and 'the substance of EPC seems to have been accepted more or less by the present (1982) parliamentary parties with the exception of the Left Socialists,' which is at variation from the general skepticism held by Danish parties of the Left (including Social Democrats) concerning EC membership (Haagerup and Thune 1983: 107) .
Similarly, the debate over defense issues during the ratification of the TEU quickly raised the profile of political co-operation. And of course, political cooperation 'failures' such as the disintegration of Yugoslavia have led European citizens (and others) to pay far more attention to the EU's efforts in this area. Finally, the European Parliament has been a strong advocate of improving public awareness and democratic control of political co-operation (and of European integration in general), which also serves to keep citizens aware of the issue. These factors clearly have changed public opinion regarding EU foreign policy co-operation, moving it from a passive consensus to an expectation (if not yet a demand) that such cooperation is appropriate.
To show this change in support, we can compare public opinion data since EPC became a serious topic of debate during the ratification of the SEA. Although some public opinion polls confuse foreign policy co-operation with security/defense cooperation, which involves the American/NATO role in Europe's defense, standard Eurobarometer polls distinguish between the two. As Table 2 reveals, there has been a clear growth in public support for common action in foreign policy since the SEA.
Thus, where only two EU states (Germany and the United Kingdom) of those polled showed a majority of public support for European foreign policy integration in 1987, less than ten years later a majority in all EU states favored this goal. In some states, such as the Netherlands, France, and Italy, the growth in support was quite dramatic. Even in the United Kingdom, where Thatcher's government for years expressed opposition to the integration of foreign policy, a majority of British citizens have been quite amenable to the idea of such integration. It should also be noted that much of the growth in support is owing to the mere appearance of the issue on national agendas (around the time of the SEA) in some states, not because people were opposed at first and then changed their opinions. In other words, 'people went from unconcerned opinions to pro-European ones' (Manigart and Marlier 1993: 340) .
Similarly, élite Eurobarometer surveys (made of high-level decision-makers in general, not just those directly involved in the CFSP) 5 show that 63 per cent feel that the EU was not playing a sufficiently important role on the world stage compared with other great power blocs. A minority (50 per cent or less) in only five EU states (Ireland, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, and Finland) did not share this sentiment. Overall, 29 per cent felt that the EU was playing the role it should, and only 4 per cent thought that the EU was playing too great a role. These élites also felt that the top priority for the EU in the next ten years was to establish and maintain peace throughout Europe (European Commission 1996). Manigart and Marlier (1993) also found that support for foreign/security policy co-operation is generally higher among élites or opinion leaders. Opinions do not vary much between parties of the right or left, and there is not even a consistent position in these camps across EU states. To the extent that this support grows and spills over into all areas of foreign policy across all three EU pillars (development, humanitarian aid, co-operation against terrorism and drugs, armaments co-operation, support for a European army or intervention force, and so on), EU policy-makers may enjoy a great deal of leeway when formulating co-operative policies and institutions.
CONCLUSION
A CFSP is one of the most ambitious goals of European integration. Despite the obstacles here, EU states have managed to bridge many of their differences over foreign policy by engaging in a constant process of institution-building. Although, like other EU policy areas, most of this has taken place at the EU level, I have explored an overlooked part of this process: the specific ways that engagement with the CFSP resonates back into the foreign policy cultures of EU states. The CFSP encourages member states to adapt their working procedures and, in some cases, legal and political cultures to cope with the increasing workload. Moreover, the behaviors and positions encouraged by political co-operation are now a permanent part of foreign policy-making processes of EU member states. The CFSP imposes obligations on EU states, by virtue of their membership in general and when they run the Presidency or represent the CFSP abroad. These responsibilities require that they act as a point of access for outsiders wishing to make demands of the EU, and that they clearly and consistently articulate, if not help to devise, the 'European interest' in a variety of contexts. Both of these responsibilities strongly encourage changes of process in EU member states.
The next stage of this research will focus on the extent to which these changes of process encourage changes in the foreign policy preferences, or interests, of EU states. This process of preference change, engrenage or concertation, whereby the demands of EU membership and the habits of working together create and upgrade the idea of a common European interest, is well documented in other areas. Given the ways that political co-operation has been penetrating into the domestic political structures of EU states, it is reasonable to suppose that preference change has been taking place in this domain as well. Future research should examine how EU states have changed their positions on a range of issues most relevant to the EU, both geographic (such as the Middle East, South Africa, Central America, East/West relations) and functional (such as arms control, humanitarian aid, and human rights). We might even begin to determine whether the EU's common foreign policies, or acquis politique, have encouraged new conceptions of interest and identity among its member states, as social constructivists often suggest. This is not just a theoretical issue. There are at least two direct policy implications concerning the domestic demands of the CFSP. First, the EU is about to undertake the most ambitious enlargement in its history by potentially accepting a dozen or more Central and Eastern European states in the next decade. The EU is rightly focusing on institutional reform in Brussels to accommodate these states, but it must also determine if these states can handle the demands of political co-operation, particularly when they hold the EU Presidency. A second, and related, issue is the new momentum of enhanced co-operation in defense policy, or the European security and defense identity (ESDI). After years of stagnation the major powers in the EU have resolved most of their differences here, and another phase of institutional development has commenced with the first-ever meeting of EU defense ministers in the Council of Ministers in November 1999 and the new goal of a common European army. These objectives will impose greater domestic demands on EU states, particularly the neutral ones, and the EU is even looking into the adoption of military 'convergence criteria' similar to those developed for monetary union. These new ambitions also demand that we pay closer attention to the domestic politics of the ESDI. This article uses 'CFSP' to refer to the common foreign and security policy under the TEU and to its predecessor, European political co-operation (EPC). Similarly, I use the term 'EU' to refer to the EU and to its previous form, the European Community (EC). I use the terms 'EPC' and 'EC' by themselves only when appropriate to the historical period under discussion. 2 These interviews were conducted by the author during 1995-6 with officials from the European Commission, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the Council of Ministers Secretariat General, the European Parliament, several EU member state foreign ministries, former EPC officials, and officials at the US mission to the European Union in Brussels. 3
The 'first revolution' took place in the late 1920s, with Luxembourg's adoption of support for a European federal union under Prime Minister Joseph Bech. 4
Previously, all European policies involving the foreign ministry had to go through the Danish political director. Interview with a Danish COREPER official, Brussels, 1996. 5 This survey included 3,778 persons across all fifteen EU member states who held the highest level positions in five groups: elected politicians, high level civil servants, business and labor leaders, the media, and persons playing a leading role in the academic, cultural, or religious life of their country.
